Almost twenty five years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia and several Central Asian republics appear to be converging on what may be termed a 'hierarchic party system', characterised by controlled and unequal competition between parties. Addressing the juncture between international politics and party politics, this article explores this convergence and considers Russian authoritarian norm diffusion as a possible explanation. This article argues that although Russia continues to build significant party-based linkage in Central Asia, similarities between party systems are the result of complex, multi-directional norm diffusion, as regimes look to liberalise or close their respective political systems.
Introduction
The aim of this article is to provide much needed detail on Russian and Central Asian party systems, but also to engage with the related issue of authoritarian norm diffusion.
Despite the fact that the five former Soviet Central Asian republics embarked on their own independent political course in 1991, there is a growing consensus that Russia, as the key regional actor, 'sets' the political agenda and is increasingly exporting and supporting authoritarian values (Ambrosio, 2008; Bader et al., 2010; Burnell, 2010; Cameron and Orenstein, 2012; Hyde, 2011; Kästner 2010; Kramer 2008; Tolstrup 2009 ). Moreover, the two seemingly unrelated issues of party politics and norm diffusion have caught the attention of academics working in the region, in particular the 'striking' similarities between the Russian party of power, 'United Russia' and the Kazakhstani equivalent, 'Nur Otan' (Del Sordi, 2011) .
Indeed, by 2015, there are growing similarities between the Russian party system and its counterparts in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, with signs that Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan may follow suit. This type of party-system may be termed 'hierarchic' in the sense that party competition is controlled and unequal, with a clear stratification between parties, based on their relationship with the authoritarian regime in question. At the top of the hierarchy are so-called 'parties of power' or regime parties that, although unequivocal leaders in these party-systems, are none the less subservient to the president and executive branch (Bader, 2011; Roberts, 2012a) . At the next level of importance is a coterie of systemic or 'soft' opposition parties, affording the party system an outward appearance of pluralism, but without ever challenging the regime. The lowest rung of the party system sees a mixture of minor soft opposition parties, but also anti-systemic or 'hard' opposition groups, which are typically marginalised by the regime, denied official registration, and/or their leaders imprisoned or exiled from the country completely.
In line with the growing interest in authoritarian norm diffusion in the post-Soviet space, could it be that Russia, having successfully engineered its own hierarchic party system, is now exporting its know-how to Central Asia in a bid to thwart the spread of democracy and bolster pro-Moscow regimes? To answer this question this article proceeds as follows. The first part briefly outlines the emerging literature identifying Russia's support of authoritarianism in the post-Soviet space. This material also characterises the hierarchic party system that was established early on in Vladimir Putin's first term of office . The second part then examines the similarities between party systems in Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as well as the growing authoritarian linkage between United Russia and analogous parties of power in these aforementioned states. The final part then considers some of the problems with Russian norm diffusion as an explanation for party system convergence, as well as the outlier cases of Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan.
Despite the undoubted influence of Russia in post-Soviet Central Asia and unequivocal evidence that United Russia is building substantial linkage with other parties in the region, this article argues that Russian norm diffusion is only a partial explanation for convergence. Instead, party system convergence appears to be the result of complex, multidirectional norm diffusion, as regimes look to liberalise or close their respective political systems by 'emulating' or 'rejecting' political innovations seen in neighbouring regimes.
This article draws on a range of primary and secondary sources, as well as a close comparative analysis of the three levels of the hierarchic party-system already identified, 
Russian norm diffusion & the hierarchic party system
The concept of 'norm diffusion', also termed 'norm transmission' (Mills and Joyce 2006) is by no means new, but its application in recent years has coincided with a refocused research agenda in response to the perceived shortcomings of 'third wave' democratisation in the post-Soviet space. The idea of 'negative' norm diffusion is intuitively appealing in the sense that Western actors, notably the US and the EU, have been engaged in 'good' democratic norm diffusion for some time (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Pevehouse, 2002) .
The current interest in authoritarian norm diffusion simply inverts the focus while employing the same 'passive' and 'active' mechanisms found in the literature on the democratic equivalent (see Levitsky and Way, 2012, 38-9; Manners, 2002, 244-5) .
Indeed, it is the nature of the international system, of weak and strong states, that provides the opportunity for norm diffusion to occur in the first place, with certain states possessing greater potential to prioritise, spread and establish their norms. According to Levitsky and Way (2005) , states which have the greatest potential to diffuse norms are those which have the greatest linkage and leverage. Leverage, relates to conditionality, sanctions, diplomatic pressure and military intervention (2005, 21) and its success reflects the size and strength of the actor applying the pressure, relative to the actor resisting. Linkage on the other hand is more subtle and has a number of aspects, including economic, geographical, social, communication and transnational civil society. Importantly, linkage also includes party organisations, which may help increase the exposure and susceptibility of states to foreign norms (2005, 23) .
In terms of linkage and leverage, it is obvious that Russia, as an undoubted regional hegemon, has a great deal of influence over its post-Soviet neighbours; a point that the literature is increasingly highlighting. Building on the work of Levitsky and Way, Cameron and Orenstein (2012) , identify Russia's favourable 'asymmetry of power', understood in terms of social or ethnic linkage (the large number of ethnic Russians living in its 'near abroad'); economic linkage (the importance of the Russian market for other post-Soviet republics); and growing international linkage (mainly through newly created institutions). The last point relates to the Eurasian Economic Union, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation; all of which have received impetus in recent years.
In fact, the idea of regional hegemons diffusing authoritarian norms through transnational and international actors has begun to receive scholarly attention, in particular the Russian-Sino dominated Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and its clearly stated reverence for state sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs -interpreted as norms that delegitimize anti-regime activities and democracy promotion (Ambrosio, 2008 (Ambrosio, , 1341 .
However, the idea of a regional hegemon exporting a domestic political model has so far received less analysis. None the less, the similarities between party-systems in Russia and several Central Asian republics raise some interesting questions. Del Sordi (2011, 12) , for example, asks if Russia is actively 'promoting' and 'encouraging' the formation of parties of power elsewhere, noting that several post-Soviet countries, including the Central Asian republics, have shown great interest in implementing the autocratic tools used to maintain 'authoritarian stability' in Russia.
While the 'authoritarian tools' at the disposal of the Putin regime are numerous, one of the key innovations in Russia in the post-Yeltsin period (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) has been to create a façade of relatively convincing political competition based around a party system and parliament controlled by a dominant, yet subservient ruling party with soft opposition providing the necessary pluralistic element and hard opposition marginalised or outlawed completely. Overall, this kind of party-system engineering is important for regime longevity, as elections in Russia, as in similar 'half-way houses', continue to be the main drivers of 'stability and change' in the political system (Schedler, 2006, 12) .
In terms of the Russian case, to date, United Russia is the paramount party within the The appearance of United Russia was both enabled and augmented by a broader process of political consolidation, in particular the consolidation of presidential power , synonymous with the creation of the so-called 'power vertical' (Roberts, 2012b, 162) . This consolidation enabled the creation and development of United Russia, but also the establishment of the important legal framework needed to control the party system, promote the party of power and limit opposition parties.
In terms of party system control, the main (but by no means only) approach taken by the post-Yeltsin regime has been to establish control over the supply of parties, in particular through the 2001 law 'On Political Parties' -a key moment in reorganising party politics in the country. In essence, this law adds to the legitimacy of the electoral process by creating legal 'pressure points' over existing parties while raising barriers to the formation of new parties, thus avoiding an over-reliance on less subtle, 'downstream' measures associated with election commission intervention, dubious interpretations of electoral law and, of course, electoral fraud -although they none the less persist.
The important point is that while party law is not the only means to regulate the Russian party system, it is the cornerstone of control, as it allows the authorities to simultaneously promote its party of power and to 'incentivise' loyal or soft opposition and to exclude hard opposition (Bacon, 2004; Karvonen, 2007; Moraski, 2006; Smyth et al., 2007) . Karvonen (2007) concludes that non-democratic states use party law for a variety of reasons, including obstructing certain kinds of parties while granting other parties a privileged position.
Moraksi underlines this point, acknowledging that the 2001 law 'On Parties' was primarily designed to establish a lasting party of power able to weaken the independent policies of regional power-holders and to boost the authority of the president and federal centre (Moraski 2006, 215) .
In a parallel, but equally important development, Russia's hierarchic party system was also accompanied by the development of key 'ideas' in domestic political discourse, notably the importance of elite and societal 'unity' and, more broadly, 'sovereignty', that served to underpin and justify the controlled and unequal party system. The idea of elite and societal 'unity', it should be noted, was a key theme in Putin's election victory in 2000, against the backdrop of conflict in Chechnya, the perceived threat of state breakup and a general yearning for 'stability' among the electorate. In short, United Russia's entire raison d'être is tied up in the idea of 'unity' and the party's programmatic material provides consistent references to the complexity of the Russian state, including its multi-ethnic and multi-religious status that requires bounded political competition to maintain this delicate societal 'ecosystem'.
In terms of 'sovereignty', in 2006 United Russia incorporated so-called 'sovereign democracy' into its official ideology. Although receiving varying interpretations, sovereign democracy emphasises traditional Russian values; the need for Russia to follow its own style of democracy, to maintain economic growth and to preserve Russia's borders (Tret'yakov, 2007) . Among other things, sovereign democracy has been described as an attempt to simultaneously expand the political field for the regime and legitimise the party of power, while providing the ideological and operative grounds for narrowing the scope of public politics (Okara, 2007, 10-11) .
Central Asia: converging on the Russian model?
Although there remain relatively few comparative studies on party politics in postSoviet Central Asia (Bader 2009 (Bader , 2011 Ishiyama 2008) , even a cursory glance at the cases of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and, in particular, Kazakhstan, reveals a clear pattern of electorally dominant parties of power, nonetheless subservient to the president and the executive branch, accompanied by a host of soft opposition parties, with hard opposition groups typically unable to gain official registration or exiled completely. As shown in Table 1 , by 2015, the party systems in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia appear to have more than a passing resemblance. analogous Kazakhstani presidential council to coordinate youth politics (Nikitina, 2008) . Alongside party based similarities, the general development of the political systems in Russia and Kazakhstan is also highly suggestive of the influence of the former over the latter. In terms of the influence of Russia on its neighbour, it is clear that Kazakhstan pays close attention to Russian developments. A former senior official who worked for the Nazabaev Administration on a range of domestic political issues, including party-building, underscores the importance of Russia:
'Russia was lucky [after the collapse of the Soviet Union] in the sense that the main intellectual resources stayed within the country, so we were able to learn from Russia. … In the initial stages of economic development we copied the Russian experience, copied Russian legislation.' (Personal Communication, October 28, 2007) .
Different names, same parties of power?
The Russian and Kazakhstani parties of power have many shared features, but there are deeper similarities between parties of power in each of the four cases in question. As shown in Table 2 , the actual structure of parties of power in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have a notable degree of overlap with United Russia and these organisational similarities are not arbitrary. For example, in each case, the party of power is built on the 'territorial principle', which means that each party is superimposed over existing layer of regime control in each regional unit. The ability of the party leadership to liquidate branches (except Nur Otan) reinforces the regime's control over regional elites..
In terms of membership, the somewhat contradictory attitude of all parties toward exclusivity and inclusivity reveals the process of de-partification that accompanied the creation of presidential republics in 1991, in particular the requirement that party membership is suspended or terminated upon entering state service. Elsewhere, the restriction on membership of other parties is a rational measure to build elite cohesion, while the willingness of Russian, Tajik and Uzbek parties of power to accommodate non-members in their parliamentary factions allows them to absorb defectors from soft opposition parties. The distinction between 'supporter' and 'member' (United Russia and UzLidep) makes the party more attractive to high ranking elites who wish to work with the party, but who hold reservations about its longer-term viability and popularity. In addition to organisational similarities, there are also common ideological strands, fully in line with United Russia's 'unity' and 'sovereignty' discourse. One does not have to try too hard to find these same themes repeated in Kazakhstani, Tajik (Bogomolov, 2005) .
Building a hierarchic party system: a collaborative effort?
So far, there is evidence of political convergence, at least in terms of similar parties of power and party systems in Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. There also appears to be linkage between parties of power and, in the case of Nur Otan and United Russia, substantial linkage. But, while there is a strong suggestion of successful Russian norm diffusion, the convergence on the hierarchic party system is a little more complex, the result of distinctly different processes in Russia and its Central Asian neighbours.
In 'Speaking of political issues, I mean the strong presidential vertical was built in Kazakhstan earlier than in Russia…after completing economic reforms, we started to let some of the elements of the vertical go autonomously. Things went the other way round in Russia -from unrestricted democracy to a strong presidential vertical'. (Personal Communication, October 28, 2007) .
Further evidence can be seen in the development of parties of power in the states in question. In Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, 1991-2015, parties of power have been more enduring and more successful than their Russian counterparts. In short, presidential power, as a key requisite for establishing a dominant party of power and hierarchic party system, was consolidated later in Russia than in the central Asian cases in question.
In Kazakhstan, after an initial period of political liberalisation (Satpaev 2007, 284-5) , the eventual consolidation of presidential power around Nursultan Nazarabev allowed for the formation of Otan, Nur Otan's predecessor, in February 1999. In Tajikistan, presidential consolidation around Ermilli Rahkmonov occurred later, although the PDPT was created as early as 1996. In the absence of either civil war or an early period of liberalisation, post-Soviet Uzbekistan saw presidential power consolidated by the mid-1990s and by the early 2000s, the Karimov regime had successfully developed a multi-party-of-power strategy.
Second, and perhaps the clearest indication that Central Asia states are not strictly following the Russian example is the fact that the conventions governing party systems in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan -namely the previously discussed party lawmarkedly differ from the Russian variant. In Russia, the law 'On Parties' was signed into effect by president Putin in July 2001, signifying a key moment in the centralisation process and the formation of an all-national party of power. It is no coincidence that the steering committee for United Russia was actually formed on the same day that this law was signed (Ivanov, 2008, 78) . The Russian law 'On Parties' is also extremely detailed, containing 48 articles relating to a host of party issues, including registration procedures and provisions to liquidate parties. In contrast, Tajikistan introduced a modest 16 article law on parties in November 1998, while in Kazakhstan (17 articles) and Uzbekistan (18 articles) this happened as early as 1996, although Kazakhstan subsequently introduced stricter party law in July 2002.
The varying detail of these laws in no small way reflects the fact that by 2001, Russia required a strong party law to reign in its hyper pluralistic party system, while the Central Asian regimes in question were using party law to stimulate party and party system development. A third consideration relates to those prioritised ideas of 'unity' and 'sovereignty' that accompanied the development of the Russian hierarchic party system, with its dominant party of power and limited competition, packaged as a uniquely 'national' type of democracy. These ideas, it should be noted, were by no means new by the time Putin came to power in 2000 and by no means Russian. The ideas of 'unity' and 'sovereignty' are both tied to the final period of the Soviet Union, coming into stark relief with the civil war in Tajikistan, 1992 Tajikistan, -1997 In addition, the idea of sovereignty as a rejection of a universal or 'Western democracy' in favour of a muted national form was evident among Central Asian leaders at around the same time they were consolidating their power. In Kazakhstan, Nazarabev's On the threshold of the twenty first century, published in 1996 gives a clear insight into his thoughts on political development, including his rejection of the 'global modernisation project' in favour of 'adaptive modernisation' (1996, 117) -understood to mean 'every state chooses its own model of democracy ' (1996, 138) . Nazarbaev also talks disparagingly of the 'shock of freedom ' that, if unchecked, can lead to nationalism, populism, terrorism and constitutional crises (1996, 129) .
Likewise, Karimov's similarly titled: Uzbekistan on the threshold of the twenty first century draws parallel conclusions, making a clear distinction between eastern and western traditions (1997, 177) while talking enthusiastically of the need to concentrate power in the executive branch to guide democratic development (1997, 153) . The final part of Karimov's book emphasises the importance of 'non-interference in the internal affairs of other states' -a decade later the same idea was attributed to the Russian-Sino dominated Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation as a norm designed to delegitimize anti-regime activities and democracy promotion (Ambrosio, 2008 (Ambrosio, , 1341 .
Complex norm diffusion
By 2015, part of the explanation for party system convergence in the region may be ascribed to norm diffusion, including Russian authoritarian norm diffusion. This includes the ability of the Russian regime to present a workable 'pseudo democratic' model to incumbents in other states and, undoubtedly, to share know-how directly with other parties of power, amenable to Moscow, within the post-Soviet space. But the path of post-Soviet regime development in the region, and by extension that of party system development, presents a more complex picture, suggesting two-way norm diffusion that includes processes of 'emulation' but also 'rejection', as incumbents seek solutions to similar political problems. However, there appears to be little prospect that a strict party law will gain traction in Of greater significance is the acknowledgement that, although attractive, the hierarchic party system model, as seen in Russia, is neither perfect nor static. Representatives from each Kyrgyz party were quick to highlight the political instability that followed Russia's December 2011 parliamentary election -resulting, among other things, in amendments to Russia's existing party law in April 2012. 6 There was also a degree of hostility toward the idea of incorporating yet more 'know how' from other states, as noted by a senior Ata Zhurk official:
'you know we've tried to use so many models here over the years that this place is starting to look like a laboratory' (Personal Communication, May, 23 2012) . In short, political elites in Kyrgyzstan, as across the post-Soviet space, continue to make calculations as to the effectiveness of political innovations seen in neighbouring regimes, ready to emulate and reject them, based on the dictates of their own unique circumstances.
Conclusion
Russia continues to develop and strengthen linkage with all former Soviet states in its 'near abroad', through cultural, economic and militarily channels, but also through political channels, such as the party of power, as this article has demonstrated. But in terms of explaining the curious party system convergence seen in Russia and post-Soviet Central Asia, there is clearly a complex process of norm diffusion at work, one that has seen the establishment of similar party system 'models' in Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, albeit from different start points.
Aside from the calculations of power-holders that encourage regimes to either emulate or reject political innovations seen elsewhere, it should be noted that, as of 2015, there are at least two common problems faced by authoritarian regimes in the region that directly relate to party system development and that may predispose leaders to opt for similar solutions. The first is how to deal with the effects of economic pluralism, mostly from elites who seek opportunities to participate in political life in order to defend gains made through the process of privatisation. Allowing the formation of soft opposition parties may provide limited political influence to those who cannot find their place within the party of power. Economic pluralism also relates to the emerging middle class and how to absorb their demands for greater political participation. The second problem is an older one and is, in many ways, a remnant of the successful norm diffusion from the early 1990s. It concerns the issue of how to present an image of democracy to foreign and domestic audiences, while simultaneously maintaining power within an institutional framework that has at least some formal separation of powers. In any case, with serious questions surrounding economic growth, leadership succession and the very foundation of 'authoritarian stability' in the region, and with clear signs that some parties of power (notably, United Russia) are approaching the end of their lifespan, it remains to be seen how long party system convergence will persist.
